The State Giveth and Taketh Away: Public Sector Labour Law, the Legitimacy of the Legislative Override Power and Constitutional Freedom of Association in Canada by Mumme, Claire
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
Law Publications Faculty of Law 
12-2020 
The State Giveth and Taketh Away: Public Sector Labour Law, the 
Legitimacy of the Legislative Override Power and Constitutional 
Freedom of Association in Canada 
Claire Mumme 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mumme, Claire. (2020). The State Giveth and Taketh Away: Public Sector Labour Law, the Legitimacy of 
the Legislative Override Power and Constitutional Freedom of Association in Canada. International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 36 (4), 495-522. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/115 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Law Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For 
more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
The State Giveth and Taketh Away: Public
Sector Labour Law, the Legitimacy of the
Legislative Override Power and Constitutional
Freedom of Association in Canada
Claire MUMMÉ*
This article investigates the role of courts and legislatures in the design and enforcement of labour
laws in the context of public sector employment. It does so by focusing on government employers’
legislative ability to temporarily override public sector labour rights, or to displace outcomes
achieved under their processes. This issue is analysed through a case study of Canada, a country
which offers constitutional protections for freedom of association, but which is also constructing a
highly deferential approach to the constitutional review of override statutes. As a result of this
deference, governments have been afforded significant leeway in the use and design of override
legislation, which serves to undermine the legitimacy of the underlying public sector labour law
regime. The result is to shake the confidence of public sector employees in the promise of
workplace power redistribution and workplace voice and to undermine the legitimacy of public
sector labour law. Because override legislation can so fundamentally undermine public sector
labour rights, the courts should avoid excessive deference and instead undertake an active
constitutional review of their use, where constitutional protections are available.
Keywords: Judicial Deference; Public Sector Labour Law; Legislative Override; Freedom of
Association; section 2(D); The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; The Expenditure
Restraint Act, Pre-Legislative Consultation; Legitimacy; Special Interests
1 INTRODUCTION
There is a structural legitimacy problem at the core of public sector labour law.1
The problem is not, as some American pundits would have it, that public sector
unions defend special interests that use bargaining to forward their agenda and
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Legislative Override Power and Constitutional Freedom of Association in Canada’. International Journal of
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 36, no. 4 (2020): 495–522.
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1 For the purposes of this article ‘labour law’ refers specifically to the rights of unionized workers. In
Canada this is distinguished from ‘employment law’, which regulates the work of non-unionized
employees. This article considers the collective bargaining rights of unionized public sector workers.
The article also uses the concept of legitimacy and does so in three ways. The first addresses the trust
that workers have in the impartiality and enforceability of the legal regime in question. The second
refers to the debate about who holds the moral authority to speak in the public interest. The third
refers to the legitimating function of the law.
displace other social interests.2 No. The real legitimacy problem arises because the
state plays a dual role in public sector employment: it is both employer and legislator.
This dual role shapes the inequality of bargaining power between the parties in
public sector employment, because not only does the government employer hold
greater economic power than its employees, it holds all the weight of state power,
including the legislative capacity to temporarily change the rules governing labour-
management relations as it deems necessary. The state’s legislative power allows it to
disregard the statutory limits it has placed on its own managerial authority, thereby
undermining the employees’ confidence in the promise of voice that public sector
labour law provides.3 Of course, in some jurisdictions, public sector employees do
not have the right to unionize or have limited rights to act in concert. Any
legitimacy issues that arise in that context do not do so from a false promise, because
there is no legal regime offering any rights at all. Conversely, in many jurisdictions
freedom of association is a value that is deeply embedded in law and political culture,
which is not so easily displaced. But in some jurisdictions, labour rights, and in
particular those relating to public sector labour law, are viewed as economic rights that
can be appropriately overridden by other state priorities. In those jurisdictions, public
sector labour law sits on shaky structural foundations.
The legitimacy problem created by the state’s two hats has become increasingly
visible over the last decades, as governments implement austerity measures through
alterations to public sector wages and working conditions, regardless of existing legal
requirements.4 In countries such as Canada, those alterations are typically achieved
through unilaterally imposed legislation that temporarily overrides existing bargained
terms or circumscribes the scope of bargaining, rather than secured through collec-
tive bargaining concessions. Canada also offers constitutional protections for freedom
of association under section 2(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, opening an
avenue for constitutional scrutiny of override legislation.5 In such a system, the
2 The legitimacy debate over public sector unionism in the United States examines whether union-
ization provides preferential access to legislative policy formation in a way that distorts the democratic
process. As we will see the issue is present in Canada but manifests in more subtle ways. For the
contours of the American debate, see Martin Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort
Democracy? A perspective from the United States, 34(2) Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 277 (2013).
3 A similar situation exists in the electoral context, where the state has the capacity to redraw electoral
boundaries to increase its chances of electoral success. For a discussion of the law and consequences of
self-serving electoral legislative action, see Michael Pal, Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the Law
of Canadian Democracy, 57(2) McGill L. J. 299 (2011).
4 Isabel Ortiz & Matthew Cummins, Austerity Measures in Developing Countries: Public Expenditure Trends
and the Risks to Children and Women, 19(4) Feminist Econ. 55 (2013); Vera Glassner & Andrew Watt,
Cutting Wages and Employment in the Public Sector: Smarter Fiscal Consolidation Strategies, 45(4)
Intereconomics 2012 (2010). See Table 1 for a list of public sector wage freezes in Europe enacted
through unilateral governmental measures in response to the 2008 recession.
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Sch. B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK) (1982), c 11.
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judiciary can play an important role in addressing the public sector labour law
legitimacy gap by undertaking an active constitutional review of government mea-
sures that temporarily override labour law processes.
The project of this Special Issue is to reflect on the respective roles of
constitutional and statutory instruments, of legislatures and courts, in the design
and enforcement of labour rights. This article contributes to that debate by
addressing the question of role allocation in the context of public sector employ-
ment. More specifically, the article investigates how the legitimacy issue should
shape the allocation of responsibility for public sector labour law as between
legislatures, constitutions and courts. It does so through a case study of Canada,
where the courts are in the process of building a deferential approach to assessing
the constitutionality of override legislation, thereby leaving the legitimacy problem
unaddressed. Drawing from the Canadian story, the article then offers some
thoughts for other jurisdictions suffering from similar legitimacy problems about
the role of the courts and the state in developing public sector labour law.
The article proceeds in the following manner: Part II explores the state’s dual
role in public sector employment and its consequences for the legitimacy of public
sector labour law. Part III provides a brief overview of the current status of
Canadian constitutional freedom of association principles and the role of deference
in their enforcement. Part IV offers an analysis of constitutional case law assessing
override legislation, focusing on challenges to the 2009 Expenditure Restraint Act.6
With this analysis before us, Part V explores the significance of override case law
on the perceived legitimacy of public sector labour, in Canada and elsewhere.
2 THE STATE’S TWO HATS IN CANADIAN PUBLIC SECTOR
LABOUR LAW
2.1 AUSTERITY GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT
‘How about some public-sector sacrifice, too?’, reads a recent newspaper headline about
the economic impact of the Corona virus of 2019 (COVID 19) in Canada.7 Austerity
governance has been the order of the day in Canada for the last forty years, characterized
by the dismantlement of welfare state programs, public service provisioning, the
retrenchment of labour rights, and public sector wage restraint initiatives.8 Controls
6 Expenditure Restraint Act, SC 2009, c 2, s. 393 [ERA].
7 Jack Mintz, How About Some Public-Sector Sacrifice, Too?, The Financial Post (13 May 2020), https://
business.financialpost.com/opinion/jack-m-mintz-how-about-some-public-sector-sacrifice-too?
utm_term=Autofeed&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1589366285
(accessed 18 Oct. 2020).
8 Leo Panitch & Donald Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms (Garamond Press 1988); Gene
Swimmer & Mark Thompson, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: An Introduction, in Public Sector
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOUR LAW IN CANADA 497
on public sector labour costs are often justified as ensuring that public sector employees
‘share the pain’ of economic recession and bear part of the burden of deficit reduction
strategies.9 As the previous headline suggests, this narrative has already resurfaced in
discussions about post-pandemic deficit reduction strategies.
AThe most recent wave of austerity programming in Canada, as elsewhere,
was prompted by the Great Recession of 2008 . Amongst other things, the
federal government enacted legislation capping public servants’ wages, and
provincial governments undertook privatization and spending reduction
programs.10 The majority of public sector employees are unionized in Canada,
but for the most part, these spending measures were not secured through
collective bargaining with public sector unions. Rather, they were mostly
implemented through unilaterally imposed legislation that overrode existing
collective agreements and bargaining processes then underway. Canadian gov-
ernments have long ‘resorted to legislation that overrides existing agreements’
with its own employees, rather than seeking concessions through the bargaining
processes they themselves design.11
2.2 THE STATE’S TWO HATS
Implementing public sector labour cost reductions is easy if public sector employ-
ees do not have the right to unionize. But in a country like Canada where 75% of
public sector employees are unionized, how is it that the state can simply end-run
Collective Bargaining in Canada: The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning? 14–18 (Swimmer &
Thompson eds, Kingston: Queen’s University IRC Press 1995). As Robert Knox notes, in both the
United Kingdom and the United States neoliberal governance gained ascendance by defeating labour
in two very significant strikes, the mine workers strike in the UK and the Professional Air Traffic
Controllers Organization (PATCO) airline pilots strike in the US. Indeed, he argues, the attack on
trade unionism was central to the neo-liberal agenda, because the collective subjectivity of postwar
trade unionism, rooted in solidarity and redistribution, represented ‘a kind of ‘counter-rationality’ to
the efficient individualist paradigm that neoliberalism was to create. See Knox, Law, Neoliberalism and
the Constitution of Political Subjectivity: The Case of Organised Labour, in Neoliberal Legality: Understanding
the Role of Law in the Neoliberal Project 1, 102 (Honor Brabazon ed., Routledge 2018).
9 Swimmer & Thompson, supra n. 8, at 14; Derek Decloet, Public Sector Must Share the Pain of Deficit, The
Globe and Mail (23 Oct. 2009); Mintz, supra n. 7.
10 See Bryan Evans & Carlos Fanelli, The Public Sector in an Age of Austerity: Perspectives from Canada’s
Provinces and Territories (McGill-Queen’s University Press 2018). Canada is a federal state and the
regulation of employment is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction (the provinces,
territories, and the federal government) have their own labour statutes that apply only within their
boundaries. Federal labour law only applies to employees employed in the federal jurisdiction, which
includes employees of employers who operate across the country, who engage in inter-provincial
trade, and who are specifically so designated by the Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, as
implemented by the Canada Labour Code, Part I, Revised Statutes of Canada, c.L-1, at s. 2. Most
provinces and territories have one general private sector labour relations statutes, and a number of
separate public sector regimes.
11 Swimmer & Thompson, supra n. 9, at 1.
498 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
the outcome of legislative processes that the government itself designed for nego-
tiating with its unionized employees?12 How can it legislate the end of a strike that
its employees have the legal right to undertake?
The current structure of Canadian labour law was put in place in the mid-
twentieth century. It was to represent a grand bargain for labour, capital and
society. The post-war compromise would statutorily endow trade unions with
legal recognition, and would provide a mechanism ‘to adjust, toward an increas-
ing harmony, the interests of capital, labour and public in the production of
goods and services’ recognizing that ‘the power of organized labour, the neces-
sary co-partner of capital, must be available to redress the balance of what is
called social justice’.13 This system was to be supervised by the state, acting (in
theory) as impartial umpire mediating between capital and labour. The post-
war’s grand bargain was crafted around private sector employment. Most public
sector employees, other than municipal workers, gained the right to unionize and
collectively bargain only as of the 1970s.14 Rather than including them under the
coverage of existing private sector statutes, public sector employees were mostly
granted more limited rights (particularly in regards to the right to strike) under
specific public sector regimes.15 Despite the important differences between
workplace dynamics in the public and private sectors, including the differences
in gender representation between them, public sector labour law has been
subsumed into the private sector narrative.16 This pattern continues today:
most Canadian jurisdictions hold one general private sector statute and several
public sector regimes. The difference between the regimes does not stop at the
right to strike, however. In particular, the structural inequality of bargaining
12 Statistics Canada, Union Status by Industry, Table 14–10-0132-01, https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/
tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410013201 (accessed 18 Oct. 2020).
13 Justice Ivan Rand, Rand Formula, 2150 Can. L. Reports 1251–1253 (1958), quoted in Panitch &
Swartz, supra n. 8, at 18–19.
14 In some cities municipal employees were able to gain bargaining rights in the 1940s and 50s. See S.
Frankel & R Pratt, Municipal Labour Relations in Canada, The Canadian Federation of Mayors and
Municipalities, and the Industrial Relations Centre 91 (McGill University 1954). Saskatchewan also
included public sector employees under its initial labour relations statute in the 1940s.
15 For details on the different statutory models of the public sector in Canada, see Bernard Adell, Allen
Ponak & Michel Grant, Strikes in Essential Services (IRC Press, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen’s
University 2001). For a history of public sector unionism and labour law in Canada, see Harry Arthurs,
Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 971
(1968–1969); Panitch & Swartz, supra n. 8; Joseph Rose, Public Sector Bargaining: From Retrenchment to
Consolidation, 59(2) Indus. Rel./Relations industrielles 231 at 272–276 (2004); Bryan Evans, When
Your Boss Is the State, in Public Sector Unions in the Age of Austerity (Stephanie Ross & Larry Savage eds,
Halifax: Fernwood 2013).
16 In 2019 72.6% of the public sector workforce was unionized, compared to 14.4% in the private sector.
Statistics Canada. Table 14–10-0132-01 Union status by industry. In the federal public service,
between 2015 and 2019 women accounted for 55.1% of the workforce, while men accounted for
44.8%. It is not clear whether people who do not place themselves in either category were accounted
for.
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power is shaped differently in the public and private sectors. In the public sector,
the imbalance is shaped by the economic and institutional strength of the state, as
well as its susceptibility to public opinion at the ballot box.17 But, importantly, it
is also shaped by the state’s legislative power. In the private sector, the state’s
main role is as author of labour law legislation but not as a direct party to the
relationship. By contrast, the state holds two functions in public sector employ-
ment: the state acts as employer in its executive capacity, and as sovereign
legislator in its legislative role. Evans notes that just as the private sector
employer, the state uses its managerial prerogative to control the costs of work
and production. ‘But unlike the capitalist owner, the state possesses the authority
to write and enforce laws to suit its objectives’.18 In the public sector, ‘the state
changes from informal umpire to a party of direct interest, with the ultimate
power to modify the rules in the middle of the game’.19 For this article, I will
refer to the state’s ability to rewrite the outcomes of labour relations processes as
the ‘labour law legislative override’ power.20 A permanent repeal of all or part of
a labour statute would not fall under this category. Rather, override statutes are
ones that leave a regime’s general processes in place but change the outcomes
achieved through them, that make certain rights temporarily unavailable, or that
temporarily change the scope of a right. In Canada override legislation typically
takes the form of ad hoc back-to-work legislation: statutes that change the terms
of concluded collective agreements, and/or that impose parameters on the con-
tent of agreements while bargaining or arbitration is in course.
Labour law override statutes do not create a technical rule of law problem because
the state has the legal authority to enact them. The issue is rather one of political
legitimacy in the eyes of the rights holders, public sector employees, and of the role
that law plays in legitimating state power. Temporarily overriding the terms of existing
collective agreements, or bringing to an end a lawful strike, indicates to employees that
17 Swimmer & Thompson, supra n. 11, at 1–2, identify several characteristics that set public sector
employment apart from the private sector. The public ownership structure of the employer may create
an employer interest in processes and outcomes other than profit maximization. The state often has a
monopoly over the services it provides, such that a withdrawal of labour may have a more general
rather than localized impact. Finally, electoral politics plays a central role in priority setting and
relationship management. Public sector employers may be more motivated by re-election than
longer-term goals. Public sector strikes typically save their employers money, because the state does
not run its service for profits. For public sector unions, collective bargaining power derives less from
imposing financial hardship on their employer than convincing the public of the rightness of their
cause. And although governments are typically also concerned about financial efficiency, that concern
is often targeted to ballot box results rather than long term financial viability.
18 Evans, supra n. 15, at 18.
19 Swimmer & Thompson, supra n. 11 at 1.
20 In Canada, the concept of a legislative override typically refers to section of 33 of the Charter, supra n.
5 which, when invoked, allows a government to enact a statute that otherwise violates the
Constitution.
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their labour rights are not truly enforceable – that their rights must give way to other
political priorities of the state. For employees, the promise of labour law is that it
provides them with a legal right to aggregate their bargaining power and participate in
workplace decision-making on a more equal footing. Managerial discretion is replaced
by bargained rules and processes. But the promise of this system becomes illusory if the
state can statutorily unmake the results of bargaining when it wishes, or limits the
exercise of statutory rights enjoyed by public sector employees. To be sure, in some
countries, governments will exercise self-restraint in making use of their override
power because labour rights are viewed as fundamental entitlements which cannot
be displaced without political consequence. But in the absence of that self-restraint or
political imperative, if the state gives public sector employees rights and then takes
away the product of those rights, the rights have little meaning, and trust in the
bargaining process fades away.
2.3 WHO ACTS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
There is a persistent view amongst some sections of the Canadian electorate that public
sector labour law is just a method of claiming preferential access to public resources.
Because governments are elected based on platforms that set out distributional prio-
rities, and because they have the mandate and expertise, governments should be given
wide latitude in setting labour law policy. From this perspective, it may be fair to
provide public sector employees with some labour rights, but when the state finds itself
in moments of crisis, or when other social groups have greater need for scarce
resources, those rights should give way. In other words, from this point of view
labour rights are not on the same level as other fundamental rights, like the right to
free expression, or to vote, or to security of the person.
This approach constructs public sector trade unions as special interest groups. This
framing originates in the design and subsequent interpretation of the Wagner model
statutes enacted at the end of the SecondWorldWar. Although the labour statutes of the
post-war era granted unions greater political legitimacy, they also circumscribed the
scope of permissible union action. The statutes acted to suppress the broad political role
of trade unions as social institutions, who could (and had) operated in the social,
economic and political spheres to represent the interests of the working class.21
Instead, the statutes’ interpretation framed ‘legitimate’ trade union activity solely as the
negotiation of direct terms and conditions of employment with a single employer. In this
context, Evan argues, the state ‘claims sole legitimacy to act in the interest of all citizens’,
21 Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, The Legacy of PC 1003, 3 CLELJ 357 (1994–1995). The statutory
system adopted in Canada at the tail end of the Second World War was modelled on the American
Wagner Act model, with some notable differences.
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and unions are ‘rhetorically and ideologically defined as an economic special interest’.22
This is particularly so for public sector employees, who are often depicted as unfairly
insulated from the vagaries of the market. As we will see, this understanding of public
sector unions and labour rights plays a large role in organizing the labour law override
case law and is used to justify judicial deference to legislative labour law choices. The
next sections examine how the contitutionally protected right to freedom of association
in Canada has and could be used to limit the exercise of the state legislative override
power.
3 CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN CANADA: A
BRIEF OVERVIEW
Enacted in 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms section 2(d)
guarantees everyone the freedom to associate.23 Canada already possessed a well-
established statutory private sector labour law system when the Charter was
enacted. The Charter applies to federal and provincial legislatures and govern-
ments – to the state’s executive and legislative functions.24 It does not apply to the
judiciary or private parties. 25 The framework for Charter analysis begins by
assessing whether a protected right or freedom has been infringed.26 If a violation
is found, section 1 of the Charter allows the government to justify its violation if it
can show that the measure is a ‘reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’.27
22 Evans, supra n. 15, at 29.
23 Charter, supra n. 5 at 2(d).
24 Ibid., at s. 32. Until the Charter was enacted in 1982, Canada was constituted as a federal system of
Parliamentary sovereignty, ‘alike in principle to the government of the United Kingdom’. The
Charter’s introduction now subjects legislative and executive action to constitutional scrutiny,
although s. 33 of the Charter permits governments to enact violative legislation. In practice this
override clause is rarely used. Like the United Kingdom, the executive and legislative branches are
fused in Canada. The Executive designs legislative policy. The Legislative branch writes and enacts
that policy into law, and the Executive branch then implements those laws into practice. Finally, the
courts review the content and implementation of laws for Charter compliance.
25 Dolphin Delivery Ltd v. RWDSU, Local 580, [1986] 2 Supreme Court Report 573, 33 Dominion Law
Report (4th) 174 [Dolphin Delivery]. It is for this reason that in the private sector s. 2(d) applies only to
statutory labour law, while in the public sector it applies to the state as employer and the state as
legislator. Note also that the Charter can indirectly apply to private parties insofar as Charter values are
to be used in developing the principles of the common law.
26 Each of the rights and guarantees offered in s. 2 to 16 have their own infringement test, but the same s.
1 test is used to determine whether a legislative violation can be justified.
27 R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes], at 73–74 sets out the s. 1 justification framework. To be a
justified infringement government must show that (1) the measure is pressing and substantial; (2) there
is proportionality between the objective and means because (1) there is a rational connection between
the means and the objective, (2) the measure minimally impairs the right or freedom, (3) there is a
proportionality between the effects of the measure and the law’s objective. Note that because s. 1 of
the Charter, the justification section, only covers ‘measures prescribed by law’, s. 1 does not apply to
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In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (MPAO) Justice McLachlin
explains that section 2(d) jurisprudence falls into two broad eras.28 In the first period
of the 1980s and 1990s, the Court constructed a thin conception of 2(d) as protect-
ing only an individual right to associate – to join a union in the labour context – but
not the right to do anything in association, as a collective.29 In the Alberta Reference
Justice Le Dain held for the majority that, despite the constitutional entrenchment of
freedom of association, labour rights were modern rights, not fundamental rights or
freedoms. The design of labour law rights required policy choices about how to best
balance legitimate competing interests ‘in a field which has been recognized by the
courts as requiring a specialized expertise’.30 It was the Legislature that held this
expertise, to which the courts should accordingly defer. Restraint was justified, in
other words, because the courts understood labour law not as fundamental rights, but
as political and policy-based choices best left to the democratically elected branches
of the state.
Until the early 2000s, therefore, section 2(d) was effectively a judicial ‘no-go
zone’.31 The second era was ushered in by Dunmore v. Ontario (AG) in 2001,
where the majority of the Court shifted course and recognized for the first time
that freedom of association must protect collective endeavours.32 This suggestion
was further developed in 2007 in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia to recognize a constitutional right to collective
Charter challenges to executive action. See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), 2000 2 SCR 1120, at 141.
28 Mounted Police Assn of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1 [MPAO] at 30.
29 The first Labour Trilogy included Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), 38 DLR
(4th) 161 [Alberta Reference]; PSAC v. Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 424 [Public Service Alliance]; RWDSU v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 SCR 460 [Sask Dairy Workers]. Justice McIntyre explained that ‘[p]eople
cannot, merely by coming together, create an entity that has greater constitutional rights and freedoms
than they, as individuals, possess. Freedom of association cannot therefore vest independent rights in
the group’. See Alta Reference, at 156.
30 Alberta Reference, supra n. 29 at 144, where Justice Le Dain noted that ‘the rights for which constitu-
tional protection is sought – the modern right to bargain collectively and to strike, involving
correlative duties or obligations resting on an employer – are not fundamental rights or freedoms.
They are the creation of legislation, involving a balance of competing interests in a field which has
been recognized by the courts as requiring a specialized expertise. It is surprising that in an area in
which this Court has affirmed a principle of judicial restraint in the review of administrative action we
should be considering the substitution of our judgment for that of the Legislature by constitutionaliz-
ing in general and abstract terms rights which the Legislature has found it necessary to define and
qualify in various ways according to the particular field of labour relations involved’.
31 Health Services & Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 [Health
Services], at 26.
32 In Dunmore v. Ontario, 2001 SCC 94 the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) challenged
the exclusion of farm worker employees from coverage of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. In
deciding that the exclusion violated s. 2(d), a majority of the Court, at 16–17, departed from the First
Labour Trilogy’s conception of constitutional freedom of association, and expanded the scope of 2(d)
to include the protections of collective activities, because associations can be more than simply a
composite of individuals.
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bargaining.33 Jurisprudence on the scope of 2(d) has taken several directions since
then, but the most recent Supreme Court word on its content was issued in 2015,
in what has become known as the New Labour Trilogy.34
In the New Labour Trilogy, the Court explained that the purpose of constitu-
tional freedom of association is to protect the individual from ‘state-enforced isolation
in the pursuit of his or her ends’.35 section 2(d) is designed to ‘protect individuals
against more powerful entities’; it helps empower ‘vulnerable groups and helps them
work to right imbalances in society’.36 A purposive interpretation of 2(d) therefore
requires protecting the right to join a union (to associate) and ensuring that employees
have access to a process that permits them to ‘meaningfully associate in the pursuit of
collective workplace goals’. A meaningful process of collective bargaining is one which
‘maintains a balance of bargaining power, or “equilibrium”, between unions and
employers’.37 It includes a right to collective bargaining, which involves (1) a right
to make collective submissions to one’s employer and have them considered in good
faith, including having access to a means of recourse if good faith consultations are
absent,38 (2) the ability to have ‘effective and input into the selection of collective goals
to be advanced by the association’ (choice), (3) the ‘ability to undertake activities free
from managerial control’ (independence),39 and (4) the right to strike in support of
collective bargaining.40
33 Health Services, supra n. 31.
34 The major debates arose from the Court’s decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20
[Fraser]. There a majority of the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Health Services decision, supra n. 31, but
also seemed to narrow its definition of collective bargaining. In parts of the Fraser decision the majority
adopted Health Services’ definition of collective bargaining as requiring good faith negotiations, in other
parts the majority referred to a right to make submissions and consult in good faith. The majority in
Fraser also sometimes referred to the infringement as ‘substantial interference; as in Health Services, and
in others as ‘effective impossibility’. Confusion over both issues reigned in the proceeding case law,
until the SCC in its New Labour Trilogy in 2015. The New Labour Trilogy consists of MPAO, supra
n. 28, Royal Canadian Mounted Police v. Canada, 2015 SCC 2 [Meredith]; SFL v. Saskatchewan, 2015
SCC 4 [SFL]. In MPAO the Court reaffirmed the substantial interference test from Health Services.
And in SFL the majority arguably returned to the standard of good faith bargaining.
35 MPAO, supra n. 28, at 58, quoting Justice Dickson’s dissent in the Alberta Reference, supra n. 30, at 365.
36 In MPAO, supra n. 28, at 58 the majority explained that ‘[b]y banding together in the pursuit of
common goals, individuals are able to prevent more powerful entities from thwarting their legitimate
goals and desires. In this way, the guarantee of freedom of association empowers vulnerable groups and
helps them work to right imbalances in society. It protects marginalized groups and makes possible a
more equal society’.
37 Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 965, aff’d by
Gordon v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 ONCA 625 [Gordon], referring to MPAO, supra n. 28, at 72,
82; SFL, supra n. 34, at 56–57.
38 SFL, supra n. 34, at 1.
39 MPAO, supra n. 28, at 83.
40 SFL, supra n. 34, at 51. Many public sector statutes rely on essential services designation and eliminate
the right to strike for workers so designated. The analysis in SFL suggests that all essential services
designations are per violative of 2(d), but that they may be justified under s. 1 if the statute provides a
suitable mechanism to resolve disputes.
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The test for determining a 2(d) violation was set out in Health Services, most
recently affirmed in MPAO and Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan
(SFL).41 What 2(d) prohibits is governmental action/inaction that substantially inter-
feres with constitutional freedom of association. To determine whether there has been
a violation of the Charter’s freedom of association guarantee, we first ask whether the
impugned government measure actually interfered with collective bargaining, and if so,
whether the interference is substantial. In practice, these two questions are often
collapsed into one, such that the analysis focuses on whether the infringement is
substantial. To determine whether the interference is substantial, we first ask at Step A
whether the matter affected was sufficiently important to collective bargaining that
interference with it negatively impacts on union members’ capacity to come together
and pursue collective goals in concert.42 If so, at Step B we consider whether the
manner in which the measure impacts on collective bargaining preserve the duty to
consult and negotiate in good faith. In other words, a government measure will violate
section 2(d) if it impacts on a matter of importance to collective bargaining by
impeding the ability to bargain over it, thereby limiting workers’ capacity to collec-
tively act on important workplace goals. If so, the measure falls unless justified under
section 1 as a reasonable limit on the right, because it is pressing and substantial and
there is proportionality between the objective and the means.43
Canadian courts have generally built a measure of deference into their con-
stitutional analysis, deployed in the section 1 Oakes test where the state seeks to
justify its infringement.44 Aileen Kavanagh explains that ‘deference is a matter of
assigning weight to the judgment of another, either where it is at variance with
one’s own assessment, or where one is uncertain of what the correct assessment
should be’.45 In determining what weight to give legislative and executive choices,
Kavanagh suggests courts should continually assess which decision-maker has the
greater institutional competence, expertise and moral authority, and weight their
judgments accordingly.46
In the First Labour Trilogy, the question of competence led a majority of the
Court to adopt a strong level of deference to state choices when designing labour
41 Health Services, supra n. 31; MPAO supra n. 28; SFL, supra n. 34.
42 Health Services, supra n. 31, at 93, 95.
43 See Oakes, supra n. 27. There is proportionality where there is a rational connection between the
objective and the means chosen to achieve it, the limit minimally impairs the right, and there is
proportionality between the effects of the measure and the law’s objective.
44 Guy Davidov, The Paradox of Judicial Deference, 12(2) Nat’l J. Con. L. 133 (2001).
45 Aileen Kavanagh, Deference or Defiance? The Limits of the Judicial Role in Constitutional Adjudication, in
Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory, 184–216 (Grant Huscroft ed., Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2008).
46 Ibid. Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), at Part II argues
that the legislature has less democratic competence when the issue is one of (1) absolute obligation (2)
procedural rights (3) clear or core cases and (4) the protection of marginalized groups.
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laws. It did so by narrowing the definition of section 2d rights, rather than by
widening the scope for justification at the section 1 analysis. In other words, in the
early years of constitutional labour law the courts defined section 2(d) rights
narrowly, as not applying to a host of collective activities to be regulated only by
the state. The idea was that the courts should not interfere in matters of labour
policy, which was best left to legislatures because they held greater expertise in the
area and a democratic mandate on socioeconomic issues, a view that is still held by
some jurists.47 The problem with this approach is that it assumes that policy matters
are separable from workers’ day to day working conditions. But policy decisions
about public sector spending are enacted through public sector working conditions.
Decisions about high school class sizes, for instance, represent both an educational
philosophy and the working conditions of teachers. A decision to privatize or
contract out the administration of a public program is a political decision by the
state that is implemented by terminating the employment of those currently in the
job. A decision to reduce a government deficit through public sector wage freezes
represents a general fiscal philosophy, but it is achieved through the terms and
conditions of public servants’ employment. There is no meaningful distinction
between policy and principle in this context. For this reason, in the public sector
labour law context, too much deference to the use of override legislation funda-
mentally undercuts the right to freedom of association. There may be good
arguments in other labour law contexts for more deferential review, but to broadly
defer to government choices in the use of override legislation renders public sector
labour law effectively non-binding, thereby fundamentally undermining its legiti-
macy as a vehicle for worker voice.
The Supreme Court of Canada has considerably expanded the scope of
section 2(d) in the years since the first Labour Trilogy. On the surface, its new
jurisprudence declares an end to judicial restraint and deference, acknowledging
the central importance of labour rights to dignity and equality. However, this
expanded approach has not consistently taken hold in cases concerning the per-
missible scope of override statutes, where deference remains the order of the day
thus maintaining the tradtionally thin conception of 2(d) rights. As will become
clear over the next few pages, a quiet judicial debate is underway in Canada about
whether and what role deference should play in the constitutional assessment of
override legislation. Thus, reminiscent of the first Charter era, some judges are
deploying deference through their interpretation of what activities fall within the
scope of 2d at the infringement stage, rather than adopting a fullsome definition of
47 Alberta Reference, supra n. 29. Justice Rothstein has since been the Supreme Court’s most ardent
supporter of legislative expertise in the area of labour law, causing to provide strong deference to
government choices in many of his dissents through the second constitutional labour law era.
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constitutional freedom of association, and then providing some scope for deference
in the analysis of whether the infringement was justified. Some decisions expressly
adopt a deferential approach, as did the British Columbia Supreme Court
(BCSC) in Federal Dockyard Workers. There the Court explained that:
Courts have traditionally recognized that labour relations raise complex policy issues that
requires balancing multiple interests in a challenging factual environment. Courts have
recognized that legislatures and government possess an institutional expertise to handle
these matters that courts do not. As a result, there has been a tendency for courts to defer,
where constitutionally appropriate, to the choices made by legislatures that attempt to
resolve those policy issues and balance competing interests. The effect of this is to give a
margin of appreciation to policymakers’ choices without abdicating the ultimate respon-
sibility of the courts to protect the Constitution.48
In most cases, however, the issue quietly animates the interpretation of the
doctrinal requirements of the Health Services test used to determine whether a
2(d) infringement has occurred. As we will see, two different interpretations
of the Health Services ‘substantial interference’ test have emerged in the case
law that put forward contrasting views of the legitimacy of public sector
labour law and of the use of override legislation, animated by competing
visions of the ‘public interest’.
4 THE LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDE CASE LAW
Canadian appellate courts have heard eight legislative override cases since Health
Services in 2007, with many more coming before boards, tribunals and lower
courts.49 These cases have concerned the constitutionality of public sector spend-
ing and privatization statutes that override collectively bargained terms or
48 Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 BCSC 1210
[Dockyard Trades SC], at 245, aff’d by 2013 BCCA 371 [Dockyard Trades BCCA 2013]; leave to appeal
refused.
49 A search on WestlawNext Canada reveals many more arbitral, board and lower court challenges to
override legislation. The discussion in this article examines all the decisions in cases that received
appellate consideration. The override cases are Health Services, supra n. 31; Assn of Justice Counsel v.
Canada (Attorney General) 2011 Ontario Superior Court (ONSC) 6435, rev’d by 2012 Ontario Court
of Appeal (ONSA) 530, leave to appeal refused [Justice Counsel]; Royal Canadian Mounted Police v.
Canada, 2011 Fderal Court 735, rev’d by 2011 FC 735; aff’d by 2015 Supreme Court of Canada 2
[Meredith]; Canada (Procureur général) c SCFP, local 675, 2012 Quebec Court Supérieure, rev’d by 2014
Quebec Court of Appeal 1068, aff’d on other grounds 2016 Quebec Court of Appeal 163 [Assn des
réalisateurs]; Dockyard Trades n. 48; BCTF v. British Columbia, 2011 BCSC 469 (BCTF 1), additional
reasons 2014 BCSC 121 [BCTF 2], rev’d by 2015 British Columbia Court of Appeal 1184, rev’d by
2016 SCC 49 [BCTF 2]; Gordon, supra n. 37. Cases in the override category can also include
challenges to back-to-work legislation, but none have so far reached an appellate level decision-
maker. There was one case decided by the Ontario Superior Court, CUPW/STTP v. Canada Attorney
General, 2017 ONSC 292, [CUPW], and at least one other that has been filed by Ontario Public
Service Employees Union (OPSEU) against the back-to-work order given to end the College Faculty
strike in 2018. OPSEU, ‘OPSEU to file Charter challenge over college back-to-work law’ (23 Nov.
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circumscribe the scope of bargaining. Of these, six have been challenges to the
federal Expenditure Restraint Act (ERA) passed by Stephen Harper’s government in
2009 in response to the 2008 Great Recession.50 One ERA case, Meredith, was
heard by the Supreme Court as part of the New Labour Trilogy, with five others
decided by the Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia and the Federal Court of
Appeal.51 The ERA cases will provide the basis for our exploration of the override
constitutional case law. At each step of the analysis, two different analytical
structures have emerged that each stake a claim on the deference question.
These, in turn, reveal important fundamental judicial disagreements on the use
of deference and of the general legitimacy of public sector labour law in Canada.
4.1 THE SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE TEST: WHAT IS A MATTER IMPORTANT TO
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?
The ERA was enacted in 2009 and imposed a wage cap on public sector salaries
from 2006 to 2011.52 The wage cap had different implications for different groups
of public sector employees because some were in the midst of collective bargain-
ing, others were making submissions to an arbitrator, and others had existing
collective agreements. Overall, the ERA’s effect was to prevent bargaining for a
wage increase above the capped level for five years, and to replace any terms
providing a higher increase with the levels stipulated in the legislation. Public
sector unions across the country have brought constitutional challenges to the
ERA, arguing that it substantially interferes with the constitutional right to col-
lective bargaining.
To determine whether the ERA violated section 2(d) of the Charter, the
unions at Step A first had to demonstrate that the statute interfered with a subject-
matter important to collective bargaining. In Health Services the Court explained
that the importance of the affected subject-matter is to be assessed in relation to its
impact on workers’ ability to undertake collective action. The Court noted that
matters like the ‘design of uniform, the layout and organization of cafeterias, of the
location or availability of parking lots’ would not have a sufficient impact on
pursuing shared goals to constitute substantial interference.53 However, the
2017), online: OPSEU, https://opseu.org/news/opseu-to-file-charter-challenge-over-college-back-
to-work-law/16950/ (accessed 18 Oct. 2020).
50 ERA, supra n. 6.
51 Justice Counsel, Dockyard Trades, Assn des réalisateurs, Meredith, Gordon, supra n. 37. A sixth case, PIPSC
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 965, was joined with Gordon, supra n. 37 before the Court
of Appeal.
52 The ERA therefore retroactively imposed a wage cap for two years prior to the recession which started
in 2008.
53 Health Services, supra n. 31, at 96.
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Court has offered little additional guidance on how to determine what is a subject
important to collective bargaining.
One might think it obvious that wages are of central importance to collective
bargaining such that Step A of the test is easily satisfied, but the issue has proved
more complex. There is a near-unanimous split between trial and appellate level
decisions on the analysis at Step A, which emerged because each court level
appears to have asked different questions. For the most part, the initial trial level
decisions easily concluded that wages were a matter of central importance to
collective bargaining. The British Columbia (BC) Superior Court in Dockyard
Workers noted that ‘[a]s a general matter, it is obvious that wages are of central
importance in collective bargaining’.54 In Justice Counsel, the Ontario Superior
Court stated that ‘[i]t is difficult to regard salary as anything other than a very
significant, if not pivotal, aspect of the employment relationship for most
employees’.55 The Quebec Superior Court in Assn des réalisateurs noted there is
consensus amongst industrial relationists that if ever there is a matter essential to
collective bargaining, it is wages.56 The trial level courts analysed Step A by
looking at the general importance of the subject-matter to collective bargaining.
The courts of appeal instead focused on the significance of the impact of the
government measure on the outcomes of bargaining. In Dockyard Trades the BC
Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision because, amongst other things, the
ERA’s impact on wages was not so ‘draconian’ as to violate section 2(d).57 For the
dockyard workers, it imposed a wage cap only for one year, the Court explained,
could be renegotiated in the following round of bargaining. 58 The ERA did not
reduce or freeze wages, and it did not unilaterally prohibit all future bargaining
over wages. Thus although a 5.2% wage increase was certainly important to the
employees, it was not ‘antithetical to associational activity’ to reduce it.59 The
54 Dockyard Trades, supra n. 49 at the British Columbia Superior Court. In this case the parties had
concluded a collective agreement that was reached through arbitration. The agreement matched the
legislated wage increases except for one year in which a higher raise was agreed to. Despite finding that
wages were central to collective bargaining, Justice Harris held that there was no breach because the
scheduled wage increase in 2006–2007 was the result of arbitration, which was not an associational
activity that was protected by 2(d). The BC Court of Appeal (BCCA) reversed on this ground in
Dockyard Trades at the BCCA 203, supra n. 48, holding that collective agreements reached through
arbitration were associational for the purposes of 2(d).
55 Justice Counsel at the Quebec Superior Court (QCSC), supra n. 49.
56 Assn des réalisateurs QCSC, supra n. 49, at 117–118.
57 Dockyard Trades BCCA 2013, supra n. 48, at 52.
58 This is because the wage rates in the collective agreement were the same as set in the ERA other than
for one year. Ibid.
59 Dockyard Trades BCCA 2013, supra n. 48, at 53. The Supreme Court sent back this decision to the CA
for reconsideration after Meredith was decided, see Dockyard Trades BCCA 2016, supra n. 48. Similarly,
the Quebec Court of Appeal in Assn des réalisateurs QCCA 2014, supra n. 49 overturned the trial level
decision, and noted that the ERA does not freeze or reduce wages, rather it caps salaries. The workers
here lose a portion of two pay increases, but again, this could not be considered a draconian measure
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majority of the Supreme Court in Meredith concluded that the impugned statute in
Health Services resulted in a much greater impact than did the ERA. Whereas the
statute in Health Services made ‘radical changes to significant terms’ of collective
agreements, the ERA capped wages at a comparable level to other workers in and
outside the core public service, which means that they were consistent with
negotiated outcomes.60 The impact on bargaining could not be too significant,
because many other topics could still be bargained over. The two appellate level
decisions on the constitutionality of the ERA sinceMeredith have also concluded that
it only had a limited impact on bargaining and so did not violate section 2(d).61
The majority in Health Services directs us to examine the ‘importance of the
matter affected to the process of collective bargaining, and more specifically, to the
capacity of the union members to come together and pursue collective workplace
goals’.62 The trial level decisions do so, while the appellate decisions arguably do
not. The trial level approach is process-oriented, while the appellate interpretation
is concerned with outcomes.63 In the trial decisions, the issue is whether the
legislation impacted on an important bargaining topic and thus undermined the
integrity of bargaining. If a government measure impacts on an important bargain-
ing matter, even if the impact is only small, it shakes workers’ confidence in the
bargaining process. By contrast, the appellate-level approach is an outcome-
oriented analysis which suggests that if the impugned statute has only a slight
impact, even if the impact concerns a very important topic, the statute has not
significantly affected the outcome of bargaining and therefore does not substantially
interfere with collective bargaining. The appellate approach endows the state with
greater freedom of action because it focuses on the significance of the impact of the
impugned government measure on the whole scope of bargaining, rather than its
impact on the capacity of workers to come together to bargain over the specific
bargaining issue at hand.
which undermined the bargaining process. This decision was sent back the Court of Appeal after
Meredith, where the Court upheld its 2014 decision. This decision was also upheld by the QCCA after
being sent back down by the Supreme Court after Meredith. See Assn des réalisateurs QCCA 2016, supra,
n. 49.
60 Meredith SCC, supra n. 49, at 25,28. The comparison to the negotiated wages of provincial police
forces arguably veers quite closely into a focus on outcomes rather than process, which the Court has
repeatedly said is not protected. In any case, the majority then concluded that the ERA permitted a
process of consultation about remuneration to continue, because the Treasury Board enacted increases
to two non-wage benefits, based on input from the Pay Council after the ERA was enacted.
61 Dockyard Trades BCCA 2013, supra n. 48; Gordon, supra n. 37.
62 Health Services, supra n. 31, at 90, 92.
63 The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that s. 2(d) provides a process right, not a right to
substantive outcomes. See e.g. MPAO, supra n. 28, at 67.
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4.2 THE SUBSTANTIAL INTERFERENCE TEST: A GOVERNMENT DUTY TO COLLECTIVELY
BARGAIN OVER THE CONTENT OF LEGISLATION?
Step B of the infringement analysis assesses how the challenged government
measure impacts on collective bargaining by preserving the duty to consult and
negotiate in good faith. Once again, two different interpretations of Step B are
emerging in the case law. One of the main debates ostensibly turns on whether the
government has a duty to consult with a public sector union over a statute that will
impact on a topic important to collective bargaining. The fact of this debate is
slightly strange, however, because by longstanding constitutional principles regard-
ing the separation of powers, the legislator never has an obligation to consult about
the content of legislation.64 Where, then, did this debate come from?
The issue arises from contradictory comments in the Health Services decision.65
On the one hand, the majority held that the state must not substantially interfere
with a union’s ability to exercise a ‘meaningful influence over working conditions
through a process of collective bargaining conducted in accordance with the duty
to bargain in good faith’.66 To constitute a violation of section 2(d), the inter-
ference must be ‘so substantial that it interferes not only with the attainment of the
union members’ objectives (which is not protected), but with the very process that
enables them to pursue these objectives by engaging in meaningful negotiations
with the employer. The Court noted that ‘[a]cts of bad faith, or unilateral nullifica-
tion of negotiated terms, without any process of meaningful discussion and consulta-
tion may also significantly undermine the process of collective bargaining’ (my
italics).67 In other words, Health Services represents a very strong endorsement of
the substantive nature of the process of collective bargaining. The majority also,
however, explained that ‘[e]ven where a matter is of central importance to the
associational right, if the change has been made through a process of good faith
consultation it is unlikely to have adversely affected the employees’ right to
64 In Authorson v. Canada (AG), 2003 SCC 39 Justice Major stated that the only procedure due to
Canadian citizens by the legislature is three readings in the Senate and the House of Commons. Upon
receiving Royal Assent, legislation within Parliament’s competence is ‘unassailable’. In Mikisew Cree
First Nations v. Canada, 2018 SCC 40, a majority of the Court held the legislative branch does not hold
a duty to consult in designing legislation. Justice Karakatsanis at 2 explained that ‘two constitutional
principles — the separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty – dictate that it is rarely
appropriate for courts to scrutinize the law-making process. The process of law-making does not
only take place in Parliament. Rather, it begins with the development of legislation. When ministers
develop legislation, they act in a parliamentary capacity. As such, courts should exercise restraint when
dealing with this process. Extending the duty to consult doctrine to the legislative process would
oblige the judiciary to step beyond the core of its institutional role and threaten the respectful balance
between the three pillars of our democracy’.
65 See Diane MacDonald, The Effect of Pre-Legislative Consultation After Fraser, 16(2) CLELJ 375 (2011–
2012) for an assessment of the Supreme Court’s commentary on this issue in Health Services.
66 Health Services supra n. 31, at 90.
67 Ibid., at 92.31.
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collective bargaining’, and noted that the union in Health Services had no notice of
the legislation before its enactment.68 These comments seemed to suggest that
there would be no violation if the government consulted with the union about the
statute before its enactment, even if the statute also made it impossible to bargain
over a topic important to collective bargaining. However, during the section 1
analysis, the majority also affirmed that the legislature does not hold a duty to
consult regarding the content of legislation.69 Justice Deschamps remarked on this
apparent contradiction in dissent, noting that majority’s decision, implied on the
one hand that governments hold a duty to consult, but also reiterated the long-
standing principle that ‘legislators are not bound to consult with affected parties
before passing legislation’.70
These seemingly contradictory statements in Health Services opened the door to
competing interpretations of Step B’s requirements. On one view Step B asks whether,
despite the interference, it is still possible to bargain over the impacted subject-matter despite the
impugned statute (interpretation 1). At the same time, it could also be understood as
asking whether the statute itself was bargained over (interpretation 2) through pre-legislative
consultation. In other words, does one need to be able to bargain over a subject-matter
important to collective bargaining? Or does one need to be able to bargain over the
content of a statute that may then limit the scope of collective bargaining? The second
interpretation becomes possible, as Peter Carver suggests, if consultation over the statute
is understood as equivalent to collective bargaining over terms and conditions of
employment.71 Whether that equivalence is appropriate depends on one’s interpreta-
tion of what constitutional collective bargaining requires.
In Fraser v. Ontario the majority of the Supreme Court arguably narrowed the
scope of collective bargaining from a right to good faith negotiations to a right to
make submissions and have them considered in good faith by the employer. To the
extent that constitutional collective bargaining is understood only as a right to
consultation, there is some logic to viewing pre-legislative consultation as equiva-
lent to bargaining. However, accepting this equivalence fundamentally changes the
traditional understanding of collective bargaining. A right to consultation may
require employers to consider employee representations in good faith, but it is
still the employer that holds the decision-making authority. By contrast, bargaining
implies that the outcome will be chosen by both parties through a give-and-take
process – no one party can make the final decision on their own.72 As Bogg and
68 Ibid., at 129.
69 Ibid., at 157.
70 Ibid., at 179.
71 Health Services, supra n. 31.
72 The scope of constitutional collective bargaining was most recently addressed in SFL, where Justice
Abella interpreted Fraser to hold that constitutional collective bargaining provides unionized workers
with the right to make collective representations to their employers, to have those representations
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Ewing point out, ‘even where there is a stronger duty to consult, this may simply
be a process which invites “the exchanges of views and the establishment of
dialogue”, the employer not necessarily under a duty to negotiate about the points
made by those with whom consultation have taken place’.73
The issue of pre-legislative consultation was first mentioned in British
Columbia Teachers Federation vs British Columbia (BCTF 1) when Justice Griffin
suggested that if the challenged statute provided an ‘equivalent process of good
faith consultation or negotiation’ about the content of the statute there would be
no infringement of section 2(d).74 Despite this comment, some courts have held
fast to the idea that a legislator has no duty to consult on the content of legislation,
such as the Ontario Court of Appeal in Gordon v. Canada (AG), and that the
principle of parliamentary privilege removes the legislatures’ internal processes
from judicial consideration.75 To hold otherwise, the Court noted in Gordon,
would be to provide trade unions with greater participatory rights than others in
the legislative process.76 ‘In short, the Charter does not interfere in the policy
formulation process, and, in particular, does not require consultation before
legislating’.77 Pre-legislative consultation is relevant only at the step 1 justification
stage.
However, others decide to run with Justice Griffiths suggestion from BCTF 1
and have based their constitutionality analysis on whether pre-legislative consulta-
tion occurred. The appeal of this approach was explained by the majority of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) in British Columbia Teachers Federation
v. British Columbia.78 Issued after the Supreme Court’s new Labour Trilogy, both
majority and dissent in BCTF 2 held that pre-legislative consultation could sub-
stitute for collective bargaining.79 The majority explained that it was necessary to
permit the government to meet its 2(d) obligations by consulting with affected
considered in good faith, and, importantly, to have a ‘means of recourse should the employer not
bargain in good faith’. SFL, supra n. 34, at 1.
73 Alan Bogg & Keith Ewing, A (Muted) Voice at Work – Collective Bargaining in the Supreme Court of
Canada, 33(3) Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 379 at 387 (2012).
74 BCTF 1, supra n. 49, at 297.
75 Meredith FCA, supra n. 49, at 98; Assn des réalisateurs QCCA 2014, supra n. 49; Gordon, supra n. 37, at
111.
76 Gordon, supra n. 37, at 112. The Court explained that ‘[t]he appellants had the same right to participate
in the democratic process leading to the introduction and passage of legislation as any Canadian.
Government employees are not entitled to privileged stature in the legislative process by virtue of their
employment relationship or their status as union members’.
77 Gordon, supra n. 37, at 113.
78 BCTF 2 BCCA 2015, supra n. 49.
79 They explained the relevance of the duty slightly differently, however. The majority held that the
legislature did not hold a duty to consult over legislation, but if it did so it would meet its 2(d)
obligations. In dissent Justice Donald held that the government did hold an obligation to engage in
pre-legislative consultations, and that doing so would be equivalent to collective bargaining. BCTF 2
CA, supra n. 49, at 288, 293.
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trade unions before legislating, rather than through bargaining, because otherwise
workers would be conferred ‘with a presumptive constitutional veto, subject only
to s. 1, over any significant legislative changes to their working conditions’80:
If the infringement analysis evaluates only the content of legislation, then any legislation
which significantly alters collective agreement terms necessarily infringes s. 2(d). The
government could not implement policy changes if doing so would undermine a collective
agreement unless government could meet the stringent s. 1 test. In substance, significant
terms of collective agreements would be afforded constitutional status. This would be a
dramatic change in the constitutional structure of Canada. Contracts have never been
recognized as constitutionally protected.81
The majority could not have been clearer about its concerns. The government
needs the ability to implement policy decisions, even if it impacts the content of
collective agreements reached through statutorily mandated collective bargaining
processes. Moreover, it needs to be able to do so without the burden of justifying
itself to the courts on constitutional review. When a government consults about a
statute prior to enactment and considers its workers’ collective representation in
good faith, its bargaining obligations are satisfied.82 In other words, the constitu-
tional right to freedom of association limits override legislation only to the extent
of mandating pre-legislative consultation; no other investigation or justification is
needed and the courts should have no greater reviewing role. Courts should adopt
a position of self-restraint and deference and eliminate the need for a section 1
analysis.
In dissent Justice Donald acknowledged valid concerns with holding collective
bargaining over terms and conditions equivalent to pre-legislative consultations.
He noted that it was of great worry that ‘government can unilaterally delete
provisions in a collective agreement, and “cure” such unconstitutional behaviour
through the notion of “consultation”’.83 The problem is that bargaining can be
‘rendered futile by unilateral nullification of previous agreements’ because it dis-
courages future bargaining. But, Justice Donald explained, pre-legislative consulta-
tion could be equivalent to collective bargaining if the process was truly
meaningful. It would be meaningful if the government consulted in good faith
and the courts undertook a ‘sufficiently probing analysis’ to ensure that had
occurred. Moreover, if the parties consult in good faith and reach impasse, the
government will likely ‘have satisfied its constitutional duty and may unilaterally
pass necessary legislation consistent with that consultation process’, and in
80 BCTF 2 CA, supra n. 49 at 73.
81 Ibid., at 74.
82 Ibid., at 37.
83 Ibid., at 298.
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situations of emergency override statutes may not violate 2(d) if there was time to
consult.84 On this basis, he explained:
The central issue in this case … is whether this unilateral nullification came after a point of
impasse following good faith consultation, and thus gave effect to the BCTF’s right to a
form of collective bargaining, or whether the Province’s “consultation” was treated merely
as a formality preceding the passage of equivalent legislation to what was already found to
be unconstitutional.85
Despite being issued a few months after the New Labour Trilogy, where the
majority of the Court arguably clarified that constitutional collective bargaining
requires good faith negotiations, here both the majority and dissenting opinion
based their decisions on the premise that constitutional collective bargaining is
equivalent to good faith consultations.
The Supreme Court sidestepped the issue of pre-legislative consultation in
Meredith. There was some hope it would be clarified when the SCC granted leave
to appeal in BCTF 2 but despite vigorous argument by the parties and numerous
intervenors, the SCC instead issued its decision in two sentences. ‘The majority of
the Court would allow the appeal, substantially for the reasons of Justice Donald.
Justices Côté and Brown would dissent and dismiss the appeal, substantially for the
reasons of the majority in the Court of Appeal’.86 As Eric Tucker points out, there
is little we can do with this decision. Because the majority of the SCC did not fully
adopt Justice Donald’s dissent, and the minority did not fully adopt the majority
decision in BCTF, we do not know which elements of the Court of Appeal
decision won Supreme Court approval and which did not. We are thus left with
no greater clarity about the relevance of pre-legislative consultation and the role of
deference in assessing the constitutionality of override statutes.
The differing approaches to Step B outlined above are each animated by
different understandings of the scope of the 2(d) right. The first approach is focused
on protecting unionized employees’ right to participate in workplace decision-
making through collective bargaining. It understands constitutional collective
bargaining as a process of joint decision-making.87 By contrast, the second
approach understands the right to be one of consultation, where decision-making
authority remains in the employer’s hands, even if it has seriously considered
workers’ representations. From this perspective, it matters little if the consultation
84 Ibid., at 293.
85 Ibid., at 311.
86 BCTF 2 SCC, supra n. 49.
87 The scope of constitutional collective bargaining was most recently addressed in SFL, where Justice
Abella interpreted Fraser to hold that constitutional collective bargaining provides unionized workers
with the right to make collective representations to their employers, to have those representations
considered in good faith, and, importantly, to have a ‘means of recourse should the employer not
bargain in good faith’. SFL, supra n. 34, at 1.
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is directly about terms and conditions of employ or whether it is about the content
of a statute that will impose terms and conditions of employ.
Similarly to Step A, at play here are opposing views on whether or not the
legislature ought to hold a broad margin of appreciation when legislating policies
that impact on public sector labour rights, thereby limiting the scope of constitu-
tional review. This position was clearly explained by the majority in the BCCA’s
decision in BCTF 2 and Dockyard Trades post-Meredith. In Dockyard Trades the
court explained that the ERA did not substantially interfere with constitutional
freedom of association, because:
Fiscal and economic context cannot be ignored. The government met its constitutional
obligations through its attempts to negotiate [over the legislation] until the last moment,
and to signal the potential effects of the impending legislation. Its response was propor-
tional to the looming fiscal emergency.88
The government consulted but no agreement was reached, and it needed to
get on with addressing an economic emergency. Labour rights simply needed to
give way to the spending decisions of the government, that should not have to
justify itself to the courts.
4.3 OVERRIDE LEGISLATION AND THE THINNING OF 2(D)
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the current trend of making section 2d
rights more robust has not taken in a good portion of override cases. Indeed, more
than offering a measure of deference to government justifications of infringement,
many courts have sought to insulate governments from a finding of that any
infringement occurred at all through their interpretations of the Health Services test.
The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that section 2(d) protects the
right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining. In Health Services the Court
held that the protected activity could be described as ‘employees banding together
to achieve particular workplace goals’.89 The majority stressed that section 2(d)
does not protect the outcomes or objectives of bargaining, but the process through
which the goals are pursued. In MPAO the majority explained that at its core
section 2(d) ‘protects associational activity for the purpose of securing the indivi-
dual against state-enforced isolation and empowering individuals to achieve col-
lectively what they could not achieve individually’.90 They went on to note that
‘[b]y banding together in the pursuit of common goals, individuals are able
to prevent more powerful entities from thwarting their legitimate goals and
88 Dockyard Trades BCCA 2016, supra n. 49, at 93.
89 Health Services, supra n. 31, at 89.
90 MPAO, supra n. 28, at 62.
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desires’.91 Surely, if section 2(d) provides a meaningful process of collective
bargaining, then a purposive approach requires finding that legislatively overriding
bargaining outcomes fundamentally guts the legitimacy of the process. ‘What could
more clearly undermine the process of “voluntary, good faith collective bargain-
ing” than a statute which removes the very clauses that have been negotiated?’.92 If
one purpose of section 2(d) is to allow individual workers to associate to equalize
their bargaining power with their employer, and one the clearest expression of the
government employer’s additional power is the legislative override, then some sort
of limit needs to be placed on when and how that power is exercised. On a plain
reading of what is required for a meaningful process of collective bargaining, any
statutory modification of bargained terms on issues important to collective bargain-
ing, or temporary narrowing of the scope of possible bargaining, substantially
interferes with section 2(d) unless there remains a way to bargain over the
impacted topic.93 The infringement analysis, therefore, should examine whether
the override statute impacts on a topic that is important to collective bargaining,
and whether the challenged statute prevents the parties from bargaining over it.
Substantial interference with just one bargaining topic that is important to a group
of workers will suggest that they cannot rely on a process of collective bargaining
to collectively choose and pursue their workplace goals.94 Where collective agree-
ments are rewritten without their consent, employees will understand that their
employer does not feel bound to negotiate important workplace conditions, and
will not comply with or respect any terms on which they reach an agreement.
Respect for the bargaining process is whittled away, as is the ability of workers to
collectively achieve what they could not on their own. The infringement analysis
is not the place for deference to state choices, because the very purpose of
constitutional protections is to ensure that the state does not violate constitutional
rights as it goes about the business of governing.
The context of the infringement is appropriately considered at the justification
stage, where it will, in some instances, help the government to demonstrate that
the state chose a minimally impairing option in the context at hand.95 Bu writing
91 Ibid., at 58.
92 MacDonald supra n. 65, at 379.
93 Some, like the majority of the Court of Appeal in BCTF 2 CA, conclude that this approach serves to
constitutionalize collective agreements - the outcomes. But, as pointed out by Justice Donald in
dissent, it is actually the reverse. This approach is entirely focused on protecting the process of
bargaining. The agreement itself receives protection only because not doing so indicates that there is
no weight to the process.
94 See Justice Donald’s dissent in BCTF 2 CA, supra n. 49, at 284–285.
95 Health Services, supra n. 31, at 157. Davidov, supra n. 44, at 2–3 makes the point that there is a tendency
in Canadian constitutional law to refer to contextual and deferential analysis as the same thing in
reference to the requirements of section. Contextual analysis is just part of the s. 1 test, while deference
is the degree of force and precision i.e. required to convince justify the infringement.
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for the majority, Justice Abella in SFL elegantly addressed the question of defer-
ence. She stated:
In their dissenting reasons … my colleagues urge deference to the legislature in interpret-
ing the scope of s 2(d). This Court has repeatedly held that the rights enumerated in the
Charter should be interpreted generously … It is not clear to me why s. 2(d) should be
interpreted differently … In the context of constitutional adjudication, deference is a
conclusion, not an analysis. It certainly plays a role in s. 1, where, if a law is justified as
proportionate, the legislative choice is maintained. But the whole purpose of Charter
review is to assess a law for constitutional compliance. If the touchstone of Charter
compliance is deference, what is the point of judicial scrutiny?96
Even at the justification stage, the courts should require some precision in its
assessment of governmental means and ends. To do otherwise is to reinforce the
idea that labour rights are not so fundamental or important as other rights because
they are socioeconomic and policy-based, and that public sector unions are simply
‘defenders of sectional rather than public interests’.97 This entrenches the idea that
the state’s policy choices are in the interest of the whole, while public sector
employees are interested only in themselves. When that approach is adopted,
labour rights become expendable. Public sector workers have the statutory and
constitutional right to collectively bargain, but those rights must give way when
some other interest arises. It therefore ibecomes increasingly acceptable for the
state to go straight to its legislative override power and bypass the need for
bargaining at all. When the state does so, the contingent nature of public sector
labour rights is revealed. This is not to say that constitutional review is a panacea,
or indeed that unions should be relying so heavily on constitutional adjudication
for the protection of their rights at the expense of organizing public support, but it
is to say that challenges to labour law override statutes are not the time for broad
judicial restraint.
In Whigs and Hunters EP Thompson explains:
The rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more than sham. In the
same moment they may modify, in profound ways, the behaviour of the powerful, and
mystify the powerless. They may disguise the true realities of power, but, at the same time,
they may curb that power and check its intrusions.98 … [T]he law … . may be seen
instrumentally as mediating and reinforcing class relations and, ideologically, as offering to
these a legitimation. … If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing,
legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class’ hegemony. 99
96 SFL, supra n. 34 at 76.
97 Stephanie Ross & Larry Savage, Public Sector Unions in the Age of Austerity 9 (Halifax: Fernwood
Publishing 2013).
98 Edward P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters 265 (Penguin Books 1990, first published 1975).
99 Ibid., at 262–263. Thompson’s description of the role of law in mediating class relations, along with
Douglas Hay’s mediation on the property and criminal law in eighteenth-century England, provides a
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A state in possession of strong public sector labour law systems sends a message
about the legitimacy of labour law and unionization. It also sends a message about
itself, suggesting that the government is a reasonable entity willing to limit its own
power to equalize the employment relationship. Although frontal attacks on public
sector labour laws have become more common over the last decades, the tradi-
tional Canadian approach is to maintain public sector labour law regimes – to
maintain the façade of equity – but to unmake its content piece by piece. This is
what the use of override legislation represents. It provides the state with an image
of fairness and equity in employment and suggests the willingness to equalize its
employment relationships, all the while reasserting that power through the back
door.
To state the obvious, in most political systems the state holds the power to
grant labour rights and the ability to repeal them. It holds the constitutional
authority to legislatively impose terms into collective agreements and replace
bargained terms with statutory ones, in the public and private sectors.100 The
ability of governments to exercise these powers is limited by constitutional
requirements, where they exist, and normative political commitment in favour
of robust union protections. In Canada, it would probably be viewed as suspect for
the state to legislatively impose pay cuts or wage freezes into private sector
collective agreements. However, as the previous analysis demonstrates, the practice
is quite common in the public sector. In other countries, the political commit-
ments may be reversed, there could be very little commitment to collective
bargaining at all, or it could be viewed as a foundational part of the social contract.
The legitimacy question will therefore be differently constructed based on local
circumstances. Still, while there is the general question about the strength of labour
rights in a given country, there is also the particular issue of labour law legitimacy
in the public sector. In the public sector, the legislator is not a force outside the
employment relationship, it is a party to the employment relationship. Where
public sector employees are granted unionization rights or freedoms, those rights
become shaky when the employer holds the legal power to exempt itself from its
collectively bargained obligations. When it does so, it weakens the legitimacy of
the government itself.
Some will read this analysis and think the existing state of things is entirely
correct. There is a difference between the public interest and public servants’
interest. Collective bargaining inappropriately impedes the state’s ability to govern
in the interest of all because it prioritizes the needs of one group over others. In
useful analysis of the law’s role in legitimating state power and class relations. I disagree, however, with
Thompson’s musings on the nature of the rule of law and of law itself.
100 In some countries the Constitution lays down detailed labour rights, significantly limiting the scope of
legislative decision-making in the area. Portugal is an example of this kind of country.
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this context, why should the state bargain at all when it can simply legislate its
desired outcomes? The idea that public sector labour rights clash with the public
interest rests on a false distinction because, for all the reasons Thompson explains, it
is in the public interest to enforce public sector labour rights, whether through the actions
of the government as employer, of courts as constitutional supervisors, or by
workers undertaking collective action.101 Consider the following. The govern-
ments of Ontario and Quebec suspended the operation of collective agreements in
the education and health sectors by executive order during the first few weeks of
the Covid-19 pandemic.102 These measures were to permit the rapid staff rede-
ployment of teachers and healthcare workers during the crisis. Most people would
agree that, at least in the healthcare context, the ability to staff as needed has been
essential. But was it essential to legislatively suspend existing agreements, when
health sector and teachers’ unions stood ready to work collaboratively with the
government to achieve those ends?103 Was it necessary to exclude these workers
from decision-making that would impact on their health and safety?
Whether collective bargaining is statutorily enshrined and protected, whether
it arises from the balance of power between the parties, or from the centrality of
social dialogue in the governance of the state, overriding bargained terms funda-
mentally undermines the idea that employees, banding together, can hold a
measure of collective power when interacting with their state employer.
Whatever one might think of the appropriate role distribution between legislatures
and courts in the design and implementation of labour rights, in the context of
public sector labour law, where constitutional labour rights protections exist, the
courts should use their reviewing power to scrutinize the exercise of the override
power. When they fail to do so, they further undermine the legitimacy of public
sector labour and make clear the overwhelming power of the government as an
employer.
101 Public sector trade unions also play an important socioeconomic role in advancing general workplace
justice issues.
102 Order Made Under Subs. 7.02(4) of the Act, O.Reg 74/20; Craig S Rix et al, COVID-19 and
Staffing – Province Issues Emergency Order for Health Service Providers (22 Mar. 2020), https://hicksmorley.
com/2020/03/22/covid-19-and-staffing-province-issues-emergency-order-for-health-service-provi
ders/ (accessed 18 Oct. 2020); Québec, Gazette Officielle du Québec, Ministerial Order Number 2020–
004 of the Minister of Health and Social Services Dated 15 March 2020, vol. 152 No 12A (Québec, 18 Mar.
2020) at 765A.
103 CUPE, Order Waiving Contract Protections for Hospital Staff Is Unnecessary, Disrespectful and Coercive (23
Mar. 2020), https://cupe.ca/order-waiving-contract-protections-hospital-staff-unnecessary-disrespect
ful-and-coercive (accessed 18 Oct. 2020).
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5 CONCLUSION
Governments across Canada, and the world, have begun planning for the recession
that will likely follow the pandemic. The government of Manitoba has recently
announced its intention to initiate deep cuts to government programs and public
sector labour costs, which may require opening up existing agreements to put in
place. Amidst the pandemic, the province of Alberta is attempting to reduce
doctors’ compensation, despite the existence of binding collective agreements.104
The chances are that some or all of these measures will be implemented by
legislative override and that more will come.
As indicated above, pundits are already calling for the introduction of public
sector wage restraint initiatives, because public sector workers are not suffering
economically to the degree of others. Nurses, doctors, teachers, garbage collectors,
public transit drivers, the public servants that built the infrastructure for emergency
governmental support programs, these are the workers who must ‘share the pain’
that they are otherwise sheltered from. They are considered self-interested actors
who unfairly avoid the harms the market imposes on others, rather than workers
who are putting their bodies on the line for the community. Based on the case law
examined here, it remains to be seen whether section 2(d) of the Charter will offer
some protection against austerity labour measures imposed through override leg-
islation. Other countries may face similar issues, even if structured in different
ways. If the past is any indication, the legal response to this question will turn on
whether the Supreme Court has truly opted for a purposive approach to freedom
of association, and whether section 2(d) is seen as a legitimate constitutional right
or a conditional one that should give way in the face of more pressing needs. The
courts’ choice on this matter will dictate whether public sector employees actually
possess a right to bargaining, or whether the ‘act of associating [has become]
essentially futile’.105
104 Jesse Hajer & Lynne Fernandez, Austerity and COVID-19: Manitoba Government Creating, Not Solving,
Problems, CBC (21 Apr. 2020), online, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-govern
ment-economy-covid-19-1.5539666; CalebHenry,The Alberta Government Versus Its Physicians: Is Freedom
of Association at Risk? (4 May 2020), online: Canadian Law of Work Forum, http://lawofwork.ca/the-
alberta-government-versus-its-physicians-is-freedom-of-association-at-risk/ (accessed 18 Oct. 2020).
105 BCTF 2 BCCA 2015, supra n. 49, at 298.
PUBLIC SECTOR LABOUR LAW IN CANADA 521

